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INTRODUCTION
It is the legal responsibility of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank to
support financial stability. This activity includes monitoring
the factors that have an impact on the operation of the
financial system. In this context, domestic corporate insol-
vency regulation plays a definitive role since it affects the
secure operation of the commercial banks and their ability
to recover outstanding claims from corporate clients.
These factors combined have the capacity to determine
the ability of the banking system to carry out its basic
responsibility, i.e. to mediate funds between savers and
borrowers.
In Hungary, the change in the political system in 1989
brought along economic development and, consequently,
changes in the insolvency regime. The first major overhaul
of corporate insolvency regulation was commenced in
2003 in the wake of strong criticism articulated by different
sources. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development voiced their worries on the subject that cred-
itors have little say in the business affairs of insolvent com-
panies, and that it is difficult for them to exercise even the
scant rights they have. Judges, liquidators and temporary
administrators pointed out that they have no means to
block attempts to rescue assets to the detriment of credi-
tors. The Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority and
the Magyar Nemzeti Bank underlined that the current reg-
ulation is inadequate to guarantee that banks operate safe-
ly in accordance with international standards.
Regulatory changes so far indicate a shift toward better
and improved regulation as they now contain facilities
enabling creditors to recover their outstanding claims at a
higher rate. Thanks to the application of international stan-
dards, commercial banks are now able to mediate funds
under better safety conditions, i.e. they can operate more
beneficially from the perspective of financial stability.
Corporate insolvency regulation nevertheless remains
imperfect. The entitlements of creditors have to be further
improved so as to enable liquidators and temporary
administrators to better represent the interests of creditors
in the proceedings.
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Corporate insolvency regulation is of decisive relevance for banks in terms of their secure operation and ability to recov-
er outstanding claims from corporate clients. This topic has been the subject of many debates lately, as Hungarian cor-
porate insolvency regulation has been undergoing reforms since 2003. One of the main objectives in this regard was to
adopt new measures to improve the mediation of funds in the economy. This study introduces reviews leading to the
reform, demonstrates the measures already adopted and those in the pipeline, and finally offers an assessment of the
measures in general and from the perspective of financial stability. Reform measures adopted so far are favourable from
the perspective of financial stability, since the international standards which have been introduced improve the secure
operation of commercial banks when mediating funds. However, the reform has to be carried on, with special regard to
the enhanced creditor protection temporary administrators and liquidators must be enabled to protect the interests of
creditors in any situation and creditors should be afforded means to enforce it.
Credit risk, insolvency proceedings,
securities
Risk is inherent in any business relationship where one party owes
money to the other, namely that he or she will not honour the debt.
This uncertainty factor is referred to as credit risk. Moreover, credi-
tors may face the possibility of being able to have a claim repaid only
in an insolvency proceeding, where they are prone to share the
debtor's assets with other creditors. Among two types of insolvency
proceedings in Hungary, bankruptcy proceedings are lodged by the
company’s management in an effort to persuade its creditors to accept
that the current financial difficulties are only temporary, and that
these difficulties may be resolved by rescheduling. Liquidation pro-
ceedings may be requested by the creditors as well, with the aim of liq-
uidating the company’s assets and terminating the company’s corpo-
rate existence. Having more than one creditor involved is enough in
itself to increase the possibility of receiving little money in the end.
Moreover, the situation is worse if the regulatory environment is inad-WHY WAS THE REFORM OF 
CORPORATE INSOLVENCY 
REGULATION INDISPENSABLE?
Since the change of the old political regime in 1989, efforts
have been made to bring the Hungarian insolvency regu-
lation up to date with economic developments. However,
the criticism that proceedings are far too costly still stands.
Some of the reasons for expensive proceedings are that
the proceedings are time consuming, the regulation lacks
the facilities to allow financially troubled companies to reor-
ganise properly and creditors are granted weak means to
protect their interests. All of these issues were highlighted
recently partly by Hungary’s accession to the European
Union, and also by expert surveys of international bodies
conveying a dim picture on Hungarian corporate insolven-
cy regulation. Finally, local experts have been viewing
national regulations and practices with increasing alacrity
and growing expectations in tune with international stan-
dards.
In the following, we elaborate on some of the issues involv-
ing Hungary’s corporate insolvency regulation that have
recently surfaced.
Costly proceedings
Proper corporate insolvency regulation enables compa-
nies facing temporary financial difficulties to reorganise at
the lowest possible cost, and to terminate the activities and
existence of non-viable ones. The quality of regulation can
be measured by the time required for secured and non-
secured creditors to recover their outstanding claims in full
or in part.
In Hungary - before the reform - secured creditors were
able to recover 50% of their claims, while the ratio of recov-
ery of non-secured creditors was around 2%. In interna-
tional comparison, this index was 83% for secured credi-
tors in Great Britain, and 62% for non-secured creditors in
France (Sussman, 2005).
The low recovery of non-secured creditors was due to the
fact that in Hungary most proceedings, i.e. 90%, (Csõke,
2004) were commenced against companies with no
assets. As for the remaining 10%, the assets were con-
sumed by the high costs of court proceedings, or were lost
due to poor management decisions or fraud. According to
previous experience, the nominal value of creditors’ claims
decreased to 64% by the mere fact of entering the liquida-
tion proceeding (Frank-Lóránth, 2006). In other words,
even under the best case scenario, it is impossible to
achieve a higher percentage of recovery on the account of
the indirect costs involved, such as the claim registration
fee, the liquidator’s fee, and the wage and tax costs of the
company’s ongoing operation. Additional real losses are
generated by the lengthy proceedings.
On the other hand, the lack of protection of security in
proceedings presented a greater problem from the per-
spective of financial stability. Protection was available
subject to an agreement between the creditor and the
debtor only if concluded at least six months before the
time of commencing the liquidation proceedings. More-
over, even if fulfilling this requirement, effective securities
were included in the bankruptcy estate. The decision on
the sale of security in terms of time and procedure used
to lie with the liquidator. Due to the high costs of liquida-
tion proceedings, secured creditors could reasonably
expect only half the market value of the security.
Therefore, when calculating the securities effects on
reduction of credit losses the effective value was far
below market value, which made bank loans more expen-
sive in two different ways. On the one hand, directly as
banks demanded more securities to cover credit risk, and
on the other hand, indirectly since banks’ incurred higher
operating expenses due to higher regulatory capital
requirements.
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equate to guarantee that the debtor's assets are protected from any
infringement and that the court proceedings will not consume what
remains. Creditors may also be interested in the survival of their trad-
ing partners facing temporary financial strains.
For creditors, one way to reduce exposure to credit risk stemming
from credit relations is to secure items from the debtor’s estate, for
example real estate or securities in advance. For the entitled creditor
these ‘fixed’ property items serve as a financial source of debt repay-
ment in case the debtor goes bankrupt. These securities will be able to
reduce risks only if the creditor is not blocked in any way or form from
satisfying his or her claim. Consequently, the prerequisite of using
securities in the commercial world is that they must continue to serve
as a security in insolvency proceedings. This means ideally that they
should remain ‘effective’, meaning that they cannot be taken over and
made part of the bankruptcy estate. Should they become part of the
bankruptcy estate, the liquidator shall represent the interest of the
creditor entitled to the security, i.e. the security has to be sold quick-
ly and at the highest possible price, and the creditor has to be paid off
in a timely manner.Lengthy proceedings
A driving factor for the costs of insolvency proceedings is
the actual length of the proceedings. More particularly, if a
decision is adopted in insolvency proceedings in a short
time, financial troubles faced by the debtor will have a less-
er impact on the flow of funds between the economic par-
ticipants affected. In bankruptcy proceedings the debtor is
either granted the moratorium or has no other choice but to
terminate financially non-viable activities. In liquidation pro-
ceedings the company is quickly expelled from the econo-
my, and secured and non-secured creditors hastily
receive repayment of their claims, or they learn the extent
of their losses in a short time. In the banking system secu-
rities are quickly liquidated, the proceeds can be account-
ed and then deducted from credit losses in a timely man-
ner.
However, Hungarian corporate insolvency regulation did
not facilitate the swift conclusion of proceedings.
Acknowledging creditors’ claims was a time-consuming
process, similar to taking inventory of the debtor’s assets.
Moreover, creditors had to be notified one by one, mean-
ing close to ten thousand delivered documents in the case
of larger companies. As far as technical aspects are con-
cerned, regulation provided seven months for bankruptcy
proceedings. As for liquidation proceedings, it took at least
four months from the time the creditor’s request was filed
to the day the proceedings were actually opened. From the
perspectives of both creditors and debtors, these dura-
tions jeopardised everyday business. In spite of the fact
that under the regulation liquidation proceedings had to be
finished in two years - in line with international standards -
they generally lasted close to 4 to 5 years according to the
banks. The reason for this is that liquidation proceedings
cannot be closed while there is a lawsuit pending in con-
nection with any creditor’s claims.
The proceedings failed to provide 
any assistance for companies under 
temporary financial strains
Along with the duration of the proceedings, it is just as
important that if the financial problems of the company are
only temporary, regulation enables creditors to help their
debtors to re-establish themselves, or to carry on with prof-
itable business lines. This type of reorganisation of debtors
is less expensive than setting up a new company.
In the Hungarian regulatory environment, bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were meant to provide for this type of distinction
between companies in temporary and permanent financial
distress and for continued operation or transformation of
viable companies. However, bankruptcy proceedings
failed to live up to this expectation, which is well demon-
strated by the fact that from almost 20,000 insolvency pro-
ceedings in 2005 the number of bankruptcy proceedings
reached only 26 (Creditreform, 2006). Since bankruptcy
proceedings can only be initiated by the company’s man-
agement, creditors had no other choice but to file for liqui-
dation proceedings as part of a concerted effort to compel
any commercial partner, who is otherwise in good financial
standing but refusing to pay nonetheless, to negotiate a
settlement. These proceedings usually end with a compo-
sition agreement, for example 62% in 2003 (Frank-Lóránth,
2006), while in few cases companies under proceedings
facing only temporary liquidity problems had to be termi-
nated because liquidation proceedings made their further
operations impossible.
Yet another problem is that the management of debtor
companies did not use the time and means of bankruptcy
proceedings to negotiate with the creditors about the
debtor company’s future and to persuade creditors to
reschedule their debts, but rather focused on rescuing the
company’s assets to themselves or to certain privileged
creditors. This was made possible by the failure of the reg-
ulation to suspend all payments in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. In addition, the legal entitlements conferred upon
temporary administrators were not enough to fight fraud
effectively.
Inadequate creditor protection
International institutions frequently emphasise that
advanced corporate insolvency regulation ensures
enforcement of creditors’ interests. One aspect of this is
that in proceedings the interests of creditors are represent-
ed by an independent participant. Furthermore, it is neces-
sary that temporary administrators and liquidators have
statutory rights that enable them to protect the estate of
companies, or to increase its value by the continued oper-
ation of the company, as well as by recovering assets.
Moreover, the protection of creditors’ interests also means
that creditors should be given legal means to compel liq-
uidators and temporary administrators to represent their
interests and to keep them properly informed. The theoret-
ical basis for this requirement is that if a company
becomes insolvent it also means that its owners have lost
their investment, hence becoming an unlikely source for
creditors to receive repayment. Consequently, creditors
should have the right to take control of the company’s man-
agement; furthermore, creditors should be able to claim
any credit loss from the owners and/or members of man-
agement if they are found guilty in wilfully or negligently
driving the company into the state of insolvency.
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provide a sufficient basis for the financial liabilities of man-
agement and owners. Although regulation contained some
feeble attempts to allow creditors to exercise control over
their insolvent debtors, these did not work in reality. In
bankruptcy proceedings and liquidation proceedings
external participants (temporary administrator, liquidator),
who were theoretically independent, were appointed to
monitor the affairs of debtors. The entitlements of tempo-
rary administrators, however, were insufficient to prevent
attempts to rescue the company’s assets, while there were
conflicting interests in the proceedings of liquidators, for
they were primarily tied to the debtors. As for liquidators,
they received a percentage of the proceeds from contin-
ued operation and from the sale of assets. It was not in
their interest to provide unbiased information to the credi-
tors or the court. Moreover, they had to divide their atten-
tion equally among secured creditors and non-secured
creditors, and bankruptcy creditors whose claims were
ranked even more favourably. Creditors had no legal
means to impose any sanction upon or seek the replace-
ment of a liquidator who did not represent their interests.
Likewise, on account of the troublesome nature of the obli-
gation to provide information as mentioned before, credi-
tors had no means to monitor whether the liquidator had
actually acted in their interests. Furthermore, contrary to
international best practice, there were no special qualifica-
tion requirements liquidators had to satisfy, plus there were
no means to exclude liquidators with an inappropriate
background, more so as they often conducted proceed-
ings hiding under the corporate veil. Similarly, the settle-
ment of claims of creditors - including secured creditors -
hinged upon the liquidators. If a liquidator fails to represent
the interests of secured creditors it will ultimately jeopar-
dise confidence in securities. 
CURRENT STATUS AND THE
FUTURE OF THE REFORM
The reform of corporate insolvency laws was launched with
the goal of finding solutions to the above-specified issues.
Additionally, some other measures had to be adopted in
connection with Hungary joining the European Union, and
besides, from a professional standpoint, the best interna-
tional practice served as an example when designing the
amendments to the regulation.
‘Effective’ securities in insolvency 
proceedings – harmonization with
Community legislation
The role of ‘effective’ securities in an economy is recognised
by the European Union as well. According to Community
legislation the assets under financial collateral agreements
for covering credit risk in the financial system cannot be con-
sidered as part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
Fulfilling our obligation as a Member State to harmonise
with Community laws, since June of 2004, certain assets
used as financial collateral have been removed from the
debtor’s assets under bankruptcy protection. According to
Directives 98/26/EC and 2002/47/EC, creditors are allowed
direct access to cash and securities pledged as collateral
in connection with capital market transactions, without the
need for opening insolvency proceedings.
Current reform measures were also adopted in considera-
tion of the need that domestic banks enter into financial
collateral arrangements with their clients and operate in
accordance with Community laws governing banking
activities.
One measure adopted in the reform procedure was to
recognise collateral arrangements as of July of 2006
even if concluded just one day before the time of com-
mencing the liquidation proceedings. Additionally, as of
January 2007 securities are known to cover creditors’
claims close to 100% (as opposed to 50%). Although,
liquidators are still allowed to deduct a small portion of
their expenses from the proceeds, the new provisions
place a limit on the amount to be deducted and they pre-
scribe that creditors are to be paid off forthwith. After
these amendments Hungarian banks can act on a level
playing field in Europe.
Insolvency proceedings of Community
companies – simplified rules for 
opening the proceedings
The relevant Community legislation (Regulation 1346/2000)
enables creditors to file for liquidation proceedings against
companies registered in other Member States in Hungary.
As a prerequisite these companies are required to have a
business establishment in Hungary or manage the compa-
ny from Hungary.
Proceedings taking place in Hungary are better for the
creditors as the costs are less, and as a consequence of
the European legislation, there is no chance that these pro-
ceedings will not be recognised in another Member State.
To achieve the greatest benefits it is essential for the
Hungarian court to reach a decision rapidly, and for the
proceedings to start as soon as possible.
In the same context, the measures on opening of liquida-
tion proceedings have also been simplified. Following the
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day late payment period to open liquidation proceedings,
and it is no longer a prerequisite that the debtor acknowl-
edges the claim. Since June 2006, if the creditor is able
to prove having notified the debtor, and the debtor is
unable to prove replying, the liquidation proceedings
may be opened. Creditors’ rights to open proceedings in
an easier way is an internationally renowned practice.
The new provisions provide facilities to reveal quickly as
to whether a company exists only in name, or they do not
have even the mere courtesy to correspond with their
clients.
Strict regulations concerning 
qualifications and conflict of interest
Although some progress was made in the qualification of
liquidators and temporary administrators, the major break-
through is still three years away. Effective as of January
2010, liquidators are required to have proof of proper train-
ing. Furthermore, the amendment contains provisions to
clearly separate the rules for conflict of interest for busi-
ness associations and private individuals acting as liquida-
tors. As of January 2007, the names of qualified companies
and persons are listed in the register of liquidators along
with the documents in proof of their compliance with
requirements.
New rules of financial liability 
The reform offers different ways to enforce financial liabili-
ty if any unpaid claims of creditors remain at the end of the
liquidation proceedings. According to the amendment
entering into force in June 2006, the previous owners of a
company may be held liable even if they sold the compa-
ny that was losing money or existed only on paper before
the time of the opening of liquidation proceedings. Majority
owners are held accountable the same way if they had a
history of making unfavourable business decisions from
the standpoint of an affiliate. Furthermore, members of
management are now subject to financial liability if they
were or should have been able to foresee that they will not
be able to settle their liabilities when due, yet they did not
file for bankruptcy. This latter amendment, widely known as
the concept of wrongful trading, is becoming widespread
in international practice.
Measures expected beyond 2006
After 2006 the review of Hungarian corporate insolvency
regulation continues, focusing on the remaining discrepan-
cies.
An essential component remains to be addressed, notably
that Hungarian regulation should provide for the continued
operation of temporarily insolvent companies up to interna-
tional standards. Another point is that in international com-
mercial relations it is in the interest of Hungarian creditors
to have insolvency proceedings opened a soon as possi-
ble. These two expectations emerge in tandem in one of
the proposed reform concepts, according to which the
insolvency proceedings would open upon submission of
the creditor’s request without undue delay. Opening the
proceedings would not in itself mean that the company in
question is insolvent; it would merely indicate that negotia-
tions are required in light of the company’s financial
prospects, short or long term. The bill also calls for the
creditors’ meeting to convene promptly, to adopt a deci-
sion whether to keep the company afloat with the existing
management or with a new one, or to wind it up.
In the near future new amendments are scheduled, simpli-
fying the way for creditors to receive information concern-
ing the management of their debtors and the steps taken
by the liquidator. Notifying the creditors through the
Internet will expedite all phases of the proceedings, and it
also enables them to file their claims swiftly and to call the
creditors’ meeting in a faster and less expensive way.
In the near future some minor corrections are expected to
be introduced as well, addressing, for example, technical
issues in connection with simplified rules for opening the
proceedings.
Assessment of reform measures, in 
particular from the perspective of
financial stability
Comprehensive changes in corporate insolvency regula-
tion were inspired by the heavy criticism. Some of the first
measures of the reform procedure were aimed to offer
solutions for certain urgent issues, others were intro-
duced in compliance with the obligations stemming from
Hungary joining the European Union, or to adopt interna-
tional standards. The question is whether the measures
adopted up to this point were enough to address existing
discrepancies? To answer this question let us one more
time go over the critical issues described earlier in this
study.
Proceedings shall be less costly
From the perspective of financial stability it is of utmost
importance that the high repayment ratio (close to 100%)
guaranteed to secured creditors by law and the financial
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of higher recovery rate of claims. This will enable banks to
operate in a safer environment in accordance with interna-
tional standards. In terms of cost efficiency another posi-
tive development is the possibility of opening proceedings
in Hungary against companies registered in any Member
State. Costs may be further reduced if the proceedings are
conducted faster, which is now possible since the simpler
rules for opening proceedings have been adopted. Strict
regulations concerning qualifications and conflict of inter-
est may have a similar effect on costs.
However, several uncertainty factors remain. There is still
no guarantee that liquidators will strive to obtain the high-
est possible price for assets pledged as securities, or to
pay off the claims of creditors as fast as possible. It is yet
unforeseeable what will be the cost of proving the financial
liability of owners and members of management. All in all,
the single most important objective from the perspective
of financial stability is to afford more direct means for
creditors to assert their influence over the proceedings, in
other words, temporary administrators and liquidators
must be enabled to protect the interests of creditors in any
situation and creditors should be afforded means to
enforce it.
Proceedings should be less time 
consuming
One factor to reduce costs is that measures on the open-
ing of proceedings against Hungarian and Community
companies have been simplified, which reduces the time
required for the payment of claims. This is beneficial for
non-secured creditors, including banks.
Nevertheless, the regulation contains nothing about the
necessary technical aspects. There are still no provisions
to reduce the length of court proceedings. Furthermore,
the 15-day period allowed for decisions could be too long
in proceedings against companies registered in other
Member States, for it leaves the possibility open for pro-
ceedings to be initiated sooner in another Member State, in
which case Hungarian creditors would be forced to file
their claims in that court. Moreover, the simplified opening
of proceedings is not enough in itself by any means, for
additional incentives should be introduced to further sim-
plify matters when the proceedings are in progress. In this
context as well, the protection of creditors’ interests must
be intensified.
Regulation remains unchanged in terms
of offering help to companies in 
temporary financial difficulties
So far the reform failed to introduce measures to improve
the regulation of bankruptcy proceedings.
There are some improvements in the
means afforded to creditors to protect
their interests
The higher ratio of recovery guaranteed to secured credi-
tors, the strict regulations concerning qualifications and
conflict of interest and the financial liability of owners and
members of management offer some improvement in the
way of helping creditors to better protect their interests.
At the same time, despite the efforts to make securities
more effective, non-financial assets pledged continue to
comprise a part of the debtor company’s bankruptcy
assets and decision for the sale of collateralised property
in terms of time and procedure lies with the liquidator.
Consequently, additional guarantees should be introduced
to compel liquidators to protect the interests of creditors in
connection with securities, meaning to obtain the highest
price possible and to pay off the claims of creditors as fast
as possible. On the other hand, temporary administrators
should be empowered to better protect or to recover the
company’s assets. These points again indicate that it is
essential to further improve the entitlements of creditors. 
Proposed reform measures: are they
sufficient to address the problems that
remain?
The measures and concepts in the pipeline promise to
improve the legislation and are important factors for the
reform procedure to be a success. They have the capaci-
ty to upgrade the quality of regulations, as they reduce the
costs of the proceedings and thus enhance the ability of
the banking system to mediate funds between savers and
borrowers. At the same time, we should point out that – in
this context as well – it is essential that the entitlements of
creditors be further improved.
CONCLUSIONS
The measures taken so far in the process of reforming
Hungarian corporate insolvency regulation are favourable
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tion of international standards improve the security factor in
mediating funds from the viewpoint of commercial banks.
In this context, it is of special importance that the ratio of
recovery for secured creditors is expected to rise, due to
the legal guarantees and the financial liability of owners
and members of management. All in all, proceedings
should be less costly under the new provisions simplifying
the opening of proceedings and because proceedings
may be filed against Community companies in Hungary as
well. Strict regulations concerning qualifications and con-
flict of interest of liquidators and temporary administrators
may have a similar effect on costs.
However, several uncertainty factors remain. There is still
no guarantee that liquidators will strive to obtain the high-
est possible price for assets pledged as securities, or to
pay off the claims of creditors as fast as possible. It is
unforeseeable what will be the cost of proving the financial
liability of owners and members of management. All in all,
the single most important objective from the perspective of
financial stability is to afford more direct means for credi-
tors to assert their influence over the proceedings; in other
words, temporary administrators and liquidators must be
enabled to protect the interests of creditors in any situation
and creditors should be afforded means to enforce it.
In due consideration of the remaining shortcomings and of
the measures proposed to be introduced after 2006, we
are of the opinion that the concepts presented so far point
in a desirable direction.
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